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THE UNITED NATIONS
COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND
THE BALANCING OF RIGHTS
BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL
CLAIMANTS AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ
John J. Chung*
The UN Compensation Commission (the Commission) in Ge-
neva resolved over 2.68 million claims filed by governments, corpo-
rations, and individuals seeking more than $350 billion in compen-
sation for losses suffered during Iraq's invasion and occupation of
Kuwait in 1990-91. This article focuses on one aspect of the Com-
mission 's work that has drawn little attention in the body of commen-
tary describing the work of the Commission: the challenges involved
in establishing a fair process andframeworkfor resolving more than
2.67 million claims filed by the individual victims of war.
The Commission struggled to achieve a fine balance between
the protection of the rights of individual claimants and the rights of
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the Government of Iraq. The difficulty of this task was compounded
by the fact that neither the claimants nor the Government of Iraq was
in a position to submit a sufficient factual record to support its re-
spective position. This article examines the challenges faced by the
individual claimants, the Government of Iraq, and the Commission in
addressing these difficulties and describes the framework the Com-
mission ultimately employed.
This article concludes that two inter-related procedural features
served to safeguard the rights of the claimants and the Government
of Iraq: (1) the use of an inquisitorial process instead of an adver-
sarial process to decide claims, and (2) the use of disinterested third-
party fact-finding reports to supply the factual record. This article
further concludes that any future commission that addresses the
losses of individual victims of war or war-like hostilities will need to
adopt these same features.
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INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Compensation Commission (the "Commission" or
"UNCC") in Geneva is historically unprecedented. Since 1991, it has re-
solved over 2.68 million claims filed by governments, corporations, other
entities, and individuals seeking more than $350 billion in compensation for
losses suffered during Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait in 1990-91.
As the operation of the Commission nears completion, it is an appropriate
time to examine a few of the difficult issues raised by the nature of the
claims resolution process and to determine what lessons or precedents can be
applied to any similar undertaking in the future. This article focuses in par-
ticular on one aspect of the Commission's work that has drawn little atten-
tion in the body of commentary describing the work of the Commission: the
challenges involved in establishing a fair and time-sensitive process and
framework for resolving over 2.67 million claims for compensation filed by
the individual victims of war.
Much has been written regarding the claims submitted by corporate en-
tities and governments, perhaps due to the fact that some of these were
multi-billion dollar claims by themselves. At the same time, the treatment of
individual claims has been relatively ignored. Nonetheless, the resolution of
the individual claims merits close attention due to the sheer number of
claims involved (and the billions of dollars sought), and the legal challenges
that were addressed in structuring the framework needed to resolve these
claims. In this endeavor, the Commission was required to achieve a fine
balance between the protection of the rights of individual claimants and the
rights of the Government of Iraq. The difficulty of this task was com-
pounded by the fact that neither the claimants nor Iraq were in a position to
submit a sufficient factual record to support their respective positions.
Part I of this article presents an overview of the Commission, including
a discussion of the circumstances of its formation and the claims resolution
process. Part II examines and discusses the procedural and substantive chal-
lenges faced by the individual claimants, the Government of Iraq, and the
Commission. Part III describes the framework and approach employed by
the Commission to balance the competing rights involved. It concludes that
two inter-related procedural features served to safeguard the rights of the
claimants and the Government of Iraq, and that any future commission that
addresses the losses of individual victims of war or war-like hostilities will
need to incorporate these same features. In Part IV, this article examines the
ways in which the Commission's framework and approach was informed by
the lessons of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.
10 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 141 (2005)
I. OVERVIEW OF THE COMMISSION
A. The Formation and Structure of the Commission
On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. The UN Security Council
("Security Council") responded on the same day by adopting Resolution
660, in which it "[c]ondemn[ed] the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait" and
"[d]emand[ed] that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its
forces."' In November 1990, the Security Council authorized the use of force
by its member states to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait.2 Under the leader-
ship of the United States, the military campaign to free Kuwait began in
January 1991, and Kuwait was liberated by March 1991.3
During Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait, civilian members of
Kuwait's population suffered loss of life, physical injuries, and loss of per-
sonal property at the hands of Iraqi forces. With this and other damage in
mind, the Security Council approved Resolution 687 in 1991, after the lib-
eration of Kuwait, which reaffirmed that Iraq "is liable under international
law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the
depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals
and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of
Kuwait."4 Resolution 687 also authorized the creation of a fund to pay com-
pensation for claims against Iraq and a commission to administer the fund.5
Pursuant to this Resolution, the Commission was established.6 The source of
1 S.C. Res. 660, 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (Aug. 2, 1990).
2 See David D. Caron, The United Nations Compensation Commission for Claims Arising out
of the 1991 Gulf War: The "Arising Prior To'" Decision, 14 FLA. ST. J. TRANSNAT'L L. &
POL'Y 309, 310-16 (2005) (hereinafter Caron, United Nations Compensation Commission]
(containing a detailed discussion of the Security Council Resolutions leading to the estab-
lishment of the Commission; Professor Caron was also a Commissioner on the Category E2
Panel of the UNCC, which decided non-Kuwaiti corporate claims).
The use of military force was authorized pursuant to Security Council Resolution 678.
S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES.678 (Nov. 29, 1990). As a matter of historical interest,
Resolution 678 would gain renewed prominence more than a decade later as the legal basis
for the use of military force by the United States and its coalition partners against Iraq in
2003. Caron, United Nations Compensation Commission, supra, at 311 n. 15.
31d. at 311-12.
4 S.C. Res. 687, 16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991).
5 Id. 18.
6 S.C. Res. 692, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/692 (May 20, 1991) (deciding "to establish the Fund
and the United Nations Compensation Commission referred to in paragraph 18 of resolution
687... "). See also Caron, United Nations Compensation Commission, supra note 2, at 310-
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the funds for the operation of the Commission and the awards of compensa-
tion was Iraq's oil revenue.
The Commission is "a subsidiary organ of the UN Security Council to
process claims and pay compensation" for the direct losses, damages, and
injuries caused by Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait and the ensuing occupa-
tion. 8 As stated in a report by the Secretary-General of the UN, "the Com-
mission is not a court or an arbitral tribunal before which the parties appear;
it is a political organ that performs an essentially fact-finding function of ex-
amining claims, verifying their validity, evaluating losses, assessing pay-
ments and resolving disputed claims." 9 Furthermore, the UNCC does not
represent the interests of a single state, such as Kuwait, or the military coali-
tion which liberated Kuwait-it represents "the whole international commu-
nity."'
The Commission is comprised of three organs: the Governing Council,
the secretariat, and the panels of Commissioners.11 The Governing Council
7 See Letter from Javier Perez De Cuellar, U.N. Secretary-General, to the President of the Se-
curity Council, U.N. Doc. S/22661 (May 30, 1991) [hereinafter Letter from Javier Perez De
Cuellar]. These funds were part of the proceeds from the "oil for food" mechanism estab-
lished pursuant to Security Council Resolution 986, which authorized the sale of Iraq's oil to
fund Iraq's humanitarian needs. S.C. Res. 986, 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/986 (Apr. 14, 1995);
see also United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC), Payment Procedure,
http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/paymproc.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2006) [hereinafter Payment
Procedure]. The revenues from the sales of oil authorized by Resolution 986 were deposited
into a special UN escrow account, and monies from this account were the source of the
UNCC's compensation fund. Id. The amount received by the UNCC's compensation fund
each month depended on the quantity of oil sold and the price of oil. Id. The contribution to
the funding of the Commission and awards of compensation was originally set at 30% of the
oil revenue. See Letter from Javier Perez De Cuellar, supra, 7; S.C. Res. 705, 2, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/705 (Aug. 15, 1991). It was later reduced to 25% and then 5% in 2003. S.C.
Res. 1330, 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1330 (Dec. 5, 2000); S.C. Res. 1483, 21, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003). The "oil for food" program was terminated pursuant to Resolu-
tion 1483 in 2003.
8 See Norbert Wdihler, The United Nations Compensation Commission: A New Contribution
to the Process ofInternational Claims Resolution, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L. 249, 253 (1999) (U.K.)
(containing an overview of the structure and operations of the Commission prepared by the
former Chief, Legal Services Branch of the Commission).
9 See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 19 of
Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), 20, U.N. Doc. S/22559 (May 2, 1991) [hereinafter
Report of the Secretary-General].
10 Andrea Gattini, The UN Compensation Commission: Old Rules, New Procedures on War
Reparations, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 161, 165 (2002) (Italy).
11 Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 9, 5 - 6; see also Wiihler, supra note 8, at
253.
sets the Commission's policies and holds the power of final approval of the
reports and recommendations setting forth the decisions made by the panels
of Commissioners.12 The Commissioners evaluate and decide the claims.' 3
They verify the claims, determine whether the claimed losses are the direct
result of Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait, assess the amount of
loss, and recommend compensation awards to the Governing Council for its
approval. 14 The secretariat is responsible for providing the Governing Coun-
cil and the Commissioners with legal, technical and administrative support.
15
In particular, the secretariat provides services to the Governing Council and
to the Commissioners relating to the processing of claims and the develop-
ment of procedures for evaluating the claims. 16 It also compiles such infor-
12 Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 9, 10; Wtihier, supra note 8, at 252. The
Governing Council established the criteria for the compensability of claims and the rules and
procedures for their processing. Id. The rules are set forth in Provisional Rules for Claims
Procedure, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1992/INF.1 (1992) [hereinafter Rules], which were adopted
by the Governing Council in 1992. See U.N. Compensation Commission, Governing Coun-
cil, Decision taken by the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commis-
sion at the 2 7th meeting, Sixth Session held on 26 June 1992, at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/AC.26/1992/10 (June 26, 1992).
The composition of the Governing Council is the same as the U.N. Security Council at
any given time. See Wiihler, supra note 8, at 252.
13 Id. at 252. The Commissioners worked in panels of three. Id. While the Governing Coun-
cil was empowered with the authority to establish the general rules regarding the disposition
of claims, it was the duty of the Commissioners "to identify the applicable principles and ap-
ply them to the circumstances of particular cases." See U.N. Compensation Commission,
Governing Council, Decision taken by the Governing Council of the United Nations Compen-
sation Commission during resumed Fourth Session, at the 23rd Meeting, held on 6 March
1992; Propositions and Conclusion on Compensation for Business Losses: Types of Damages
and Their Valuation, 3, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1992/9 (June 6, 1992). Although this decision
was not made within the specific context of the treatment of individual claims, the quoted
statement may be viewed as being generally applicable to the work of the Commissioners.
See David J. Bederman, The United Nations Compensation Commission and the Tradition of
International Claims Settlement, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 19 (1994).
The Commissioners were appointed on the basis of their expertise in fields such as "fi-
nance, law, accountancy, insurance, and environmental damage assessment," with "due re-
gard to the need for geographical representation, professional qualifications, experience and
integrity." See Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 9, 5; see also Rules, supra note
12, at 12.
14 Wiihler, supra note 8, at 252.
1 d. at 253.
16 U.N. Compensation Commission, Governing Council, Report and Recommendations Made
by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the First Instalment of Individual Claims for
Damages up to US$100,000 (Category "C" Claims), at 5-6, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1994/3 (Dec.
21, 1994) [hereinafter Category "C "Report].
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mation as may be mandated by the Rules or requested by the Commissioners
to assist them in their review of the claims, and provides the technical ad-
ministration of the Fund. 17 The relative roles of the three organs with respect
to one another were summarized by the Secretary-General in the following
manner:
Claims will be addressed to the Commission. The Commission will
make a preliminary assessment of the claims, which will be carried
out by the Secretariat, to determine whether they meet the formal re-
quirements established by the Governing Council. The claims would
then be submitted to verification and evaluation by panels normally
comprised of three commissioners for this purpose.
In total, the Commission received over 2.68 million claims from all
categories of claimants seeking compensation for more than $350 billion.' 9
The Commission is the largest claims commission in the history of interna-
tional claims. 20 Its establishment has been described as "unique" and "un-
precedented.",2' It was certainly unprecedented in that it was the first time the
17 Id.
18 Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 9, 26.
19 Mojtaba Kazazi, An Overview of Evidence before the United Nations Compensation Com-
mission, 1 INT'L LAW FORUM Du DROIT INT'L 219 (1999) (Mr. Kazazi is the Chief of the
Governing Council Secretariat of the Commission).
20 Id.
21 See Robert C. O'Brien, The Challenge of Verifying Corporate and Government Claims at
the United Nations Compensation Commission, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 4 (1998).
Some commentators have taken a different view as to whether the Commission is truly
unprecedented and have described it as being similar in nature to earlier tribunals such as the
reparations scheme established under the 1919 Treaty of Versailles between the victorious
Allied powers and Germany. See Bederman, supra note 13, at 6-11; Elyse J. Garmise, Note,
The Iraqi Claims Process and the Ghost of Versailles, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 840 (1992). Such
comparisons have generally been unflattering in that both compensation schemes have been
characterized as coercive and retributive impositions of liability by the winner over the loser.
See Bederman, supra note 13, at 6; Garmise, supra, at 856-62, 871. However, the UNCC rep-
resented a significant departure from traditional models of claims settlement. The typical
model usually involved bilateral negotiations between formerly hostile nations leading to a
lump sum settlement out of which claims could be paid. Stanley J. Glod, International
Claims Arising from Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait, 25 INT'L L. 713 (1991).
Even if one were to accept the validity of such comparisons between the UNCC and
prior tribunals, there are significant and legally material differences between them. For ex-
ample, the reparations commission under the Treaty of Versailles was comprised exclusively
of representatives of the victorious Allied powers. See Bederman, supra note 13, at 7. Per-
haps more importantly, prior reparations tribunals have been limited to compensating the na-
tionals of just one state (typically the victor, not surprisingly) or the nationals of the states in-
volved in hostilities (although such instances have been rare). Id. at 3, 14.
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Security Council had established a claims commission of its kind.22 It was
also unprecedented by virtue of the sheer number of claims that it would re-
ceive and resolve.23 As of September 15, 2005, the total numbers of claims
and amounts awarded were as follows:
24
Focusing on these features as defining benchmarks of post-war or post-hostilities com-
pensation tribunals, it can be argued that the UNCC is indeed unprecedented in the following
sense. The military victors over Iraq can be viewed as the 34 members of the Allied Coalition
Armed Forces, which included Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Can-
ada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Honduras, Italy,
Kuwait, Morocco, The Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Korea, Spain, Syria, Turkey, The United Arab Emirates, the
United Kingdom and the United States. See CNN.com, Gulf War Facts,
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/gulf.war/facts/gulfwar/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2006).
However, the selection of Commissioners was not limited to nationals of these countries. For
example, the Category 'D l Panel included Commissioners from India and Sierra Leone, and
the three Category 'E3' Commissioners were from Austria, New Zealand and Thailand (the
author worked with both of these Panels of Commissioners). More importantly, the individu-
als who were awarded compensation by the Commission were not exclusively nationals of the
34 coalition members. Successful claimants included nationals from Bolivia, Brazil, Kenya,
Malaysia, Nepal, and South Africa. See Category "C" Report, supra note 16, at Annex II.
Indeed, even stateless persons were eligible for, and awarded, compensation, such as the
Bedouns (a group of Arabic people who were residents of Kuwait but who were not nationals
of any state). See U.N. Compensation Commission, Governing Council, Decision Concern-
ing the Filing of "Late" Claims of the "Bedoun" Taken by the Governing Council of the
United Nations Compensation Commission at its 137 h Meeting, on 2 July 2004, U.N. Doc.
S/AC.26/Dec.225 (July 2, 2004) [hereinafter Bedoun Decision] (also containing definition of
"Bedoun" which means "without" in Arabic). This fact by itself would seem to dispel any
notion that the Commission was formed as a mechanism to reward the victorious nations.
Thus, the UNCC was unprecedented in the sense that the compensation scheme was designed
with the global community in mind.
22 See O'Brien, supra note 21, at 4.
23 In contrast to the more than 2.68 million claims submitted and resolved by the Commission,
the following list sets forth the approximate number of claims received or resolved by a sam-
ple of other claims tribunals:
Tribunal established under Article 7 of the Jay Treaty of 1794: 565. See Bederman, su-
pra note 13, at 17.
U.S.-Mexico Claims Commission created in 1868: 2,000. Id.
Claims proceeding between Poland and Germany concerning Upper Silesia, as established in
the Geneva Convention of May 15, 1922: 10,000. Id.
U.S.-German Mixed Claims Commission (from 1922 to 1939): 20,400. Id. at 19-20.
The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal established in 1981: 4,000. See Caron, United Na-
tions Compensation Commission, supra note 2, at 313.
24 U.N. Compensation Commission, Status of Processing and Payment of Claims,
http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/status.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2006) [hereinafter Status of Proc-
essing].
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Table 1
Number Compensation Number Compensation Compensation Unpaid
of Claims Sought of Claims Awarded Paid Balance
Resolved ($) Awarded ($) ($) ($)
2,686,107 352,531,407,513 1,550,871 52,467,108,060 19,370,249,481 33,096,858,579
B. The Individual Claims
Claims for compensation were filed by individuals, corporate entities,
governments and international organizations.25 Claims by individuals were
placed into Categories A, B, C, and D.26 Category A was established to
compensate those who were forced to depart from Iraq or Kuwait during the
period from August 2, 1990, to March 2, 1991 (the date on which Iraq's oc-
cupation came to an end).27 Compensation for Category A claims was set in
fixed amounts ranging from $2,500 to $4,000 for individuals and from
$5,000 to $8,000 for families, and was designed to assist those who were
forced to evacuate by providing a lump sum payment as a form of humani-
tarian assistance.28 Category B was reserved for "claims for the payment of
fixed amounts to any person who, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and
occupation of Kuwait, suffered serious personal injury, or whose spouse,
child, or parent died. 2 9 Category C was reserved for claims by individuals
25 See Waihler, supra note 8, at 253, 256.
26 Id. at 255. Categories E and F were reserved for corporate entities, governments and inter-
national organizations. Id. at 255-56.
27 U.N. Compensation Commission, Governing Council, Report and Recommendations Made
by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the First Instalment of Claims for Departure from
Iraq or Kuwait (Category "A" Claims), at 7, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1994/2 (Oct. 21, 1994)
[hereinafter Category "A "Report]; see also Wiihler, supra note 8, at 255.
28 Category "A " Report, supra note 27, at 7-10; Wiihler, supra note 8, at 255. The need for
this category of claims and the humanitarian urgencies involved resulted from the mass exo-
dus from Kuwait of foreign nationals fleeing the war zone. Before the invasion, there were
approximately 1.3 million expatriate workers and their dependents in Kuwait; of this number,
approximately 90% fled Kuwait after the invasion. See Category "A " Report, supra note 27,
at 10. The vast majority of departees were destitute with little or no means of returning to
their home countries. Id. at 25. The claim files revealed that most of the departees were na-
tionals of Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Pakistan, the Philippines and Sri Lanka. Id. at 27.
29 U.N. Compensation Commission, Governing Council, Recommendations Made by the
Panel of Commissioners Concerning Individual Claims for Serious Personal Injury or Death
(Category "B" Claims), at 6, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1994/1 (May 26, 1994) [hereinafter Cate-
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for damages up to US$100,000.30 Category D was reserved for claims by in-
dividuals for damages in excess of US$100,000.3 The only categories of in-
dividuals who were barred from receiving any compensation from the
Commission were citizens of Iraq32 and members of the allied military forces
that liberated Kuwait (except for certain prisoners of war).33
The number of individual claims that were timely filed with the Com-
mission were as follows: (i) almost 930,000 category A claims seeking an
gory "B" Report]; see also Wiihler, supra note 8, at 255. Compensation for Category B
claims was set in fixed amounts of $2,500 for individuals and up to $10,000 for families. Id.
30 Category "C" Report, supra note 16, at 6; see also Wiihler, supra note 8, at 255.
31 U.N. Compensation Commission, Governing Council, Report and Recommendations Made
by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning Part One of the First Instalment of Individual
Claims for Damages Above US$100,000 (Category "D" Claims), 4, U.N. Doc.
S/AC.26/1998/1 (Feb. 3, 1998) [hereinafter Category "D" Report]; see also Wuhler, supra
note 8, at 255.
Category C and D claims were broken down into the following loss types:
Cl, DI: Departure costs, and damages for being taken hostage, other illegal de-
tention, and forced hiding.
C2, D2: Damages for personal injury.
C3, D3: Death claims.
C4, D4: Personal property claims.
C5, D5: Loss of bank accounts, stocks and other securities.
C6, D6: Loss of income.
C7, D7: Real property losses.
C8, D8/9: Individual business losses.
D1O: Losses arising from relief payments.
Plus, a "catch-all" in Categories C and D for all other loss types.
See Category "C" Report, supra note 16, at 7; Category "D" Report, supra 10.
32 However, citizens of Iraq who also held "bona fide nationality" of another state were eligi-
ble. See U.N. Compensation Commission, Governing Council, Criteria for Expedited Proc-
essing of Urgent Claims, 17, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1991/1 (Aug. 2, 1991) [herinafter Criteria
for Expedited Processing).
33 Members of the Allied Coalition Armed Forces were not eligible for compensation unless
the following three conditions were met:
(a) the compensation is awarded in accordance with the general criteria already
adopted;
(b) they were prisoners of war as a consequence of their involvement in Coali-
tion military operations against Iraq in response to its unlawful invasion and oc-
cupation of Kuwait; and
(c) the loss or injury resulted from mistreatment in violation of international hu-
manitarian law (including the Geneva Conventions of 1949).
See U.N. Compensation Commission, Governing Council, Decision Taken by the Governing
Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission at its Sixth Session, 2 7"h Meeting
Held on 26 June 1992, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1992/11 (June 26, 1992).
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aggregate amount of approximately $3.5 billion in compensation; (ii) 6,225
category B claims seeking an aggregate amount of approximately $16 mil-
lion in compensation; (iii) almost 420,000 category C claims seeking an ag-
gregate amount of approximately $9 billion in compensation (plus a consoli-
dated claim submitted by the Government of Egypt on behalf of over
900,000 workers, which comprised 1,240,000 individual claims 34 with an as-
serted aggregate amount of approximately $490 million); and (iv) approxi-
mately 10,570 category D claims seeking an aggregate amount of approxi-
mately $10 billion.35
The individual claims in Categories A, B, and C were resolved first (be-
fore the resolution of claims in the other categories) because they were
deemed to be of a more urgent nature in light of the humanitarian needs of
the claimants. 36 As Norbert Wiihler, the former chief of the Legal Services
Branch of the Commission, observed, "[g]iven the traditional emphasis in
previous claims resolution processes on the losses suffered by governments
and corporations, this humanitarian decision to focus first on urgent individ-
ual claims marked a significant step in the evolution of international claims
practice. 37 All of the individual claims in these categories were resolved,
and all of the successful claims were paid, by 2000 (with the exception of
certain late-filed claims).38
34 There were more claims than individuals because individuals had the right to submit claims
in more than one category. For example, one person could have submitted a Category A
claim for departure, a Category B claim for death of a relative, and a Category C claim for
loss of personal property.
35 Wiihler, supra note 8, at 255. The deadline for the filing of individual claims was January
1, 1996. See Bedoun Decision, supra note 21, at 1.
36 See David D. Caron & Brian Morris, The UN Compensation Commission: Practical Jus-
tice, Not Retribution, 13 EuR. J. INT'L L. 183, 187 (2002). Due to the large number of these
claims, "a detailed individual review of these urgent individual claims was neither warranted
nor feasible. To deal with these claims in an efficient, fair and impartial manner, the Com-
mission therefore employed a variety of techniques that fall within the concept of 'mass
claims processing,' including computerized matching of claims and verification information,
sampling and statistical modelling." Wiihler, supra note 8, at 261-62. The Category A Panel,
for example, applied a sampling methodology to certain groups of claims. See U.N. Compen-
sation Commission, Governing Council, Report and Recommendations Made by the Panel of
Commissioners Concerning the Fourth Instalment of Claims for Departure from Iraq or Ku-
wait (Category "A" Claims), 8, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/199514 (Oct. 12, 1995) [hereinafter
Fourth Category A Report].
37 Wiihler, supra note 8, at 261. The decision to give priority to these claims is reflected in
Criteria for Expedited Processing, supra note 32; Rules, supra note 12, arts. 28, 37.
38 See Caron, United Nations Compensation Commission, supra note 2, at 319. After the fil-
ing deadline, the Commission accepted an additional 43,806 Category C claims and 2,354
Category D claims, which were filed under the "late-claims programme" for Palestinians who
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As of September 15, 2005, the Commission had resolved and awarded
the following with respect to all claims in Categories A, B, C, and D:
3 9
Table 2
Amount of Number Compensa- Compensa- UnpaidNumber Cmes- UpiCate- Compensation of tionof Claims tion Paid Balance
gory Sought Claims AwardedResolved($()
($) Awarded ($)
A 923,158 3,455,092,500 859,399 3,212,887,500 3,203,868,574 9,018,926
B 5,734 20,100,000 3,941 13,450,000 13,450,000 0
C 1,736,265 11,503,436,347 672,794 5,205,107,682 5,198,753,631 6,354,051
D 13,863 16,539,225,345 10,347 3,349,985,398 2,747,412,546 602,572,852
II. THE CHALLENGES IN ESTABLISHING AND OPERATING WITHIN A
FRAMEWORK FOR THE FAIR RESOLUTION OF INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS
A. The Challenges Faced By Individual Claimants
To a distant observer, the preparation of a claim might appear to be a
simple, mechanical process of following the instructions on a pre-printed
could demonstrate that they did not have a full and effective opportunity to file claims with
the Commission during the regular filing period. U.N. Compensation Commission, Govern-
ing Council, Report and Recommendations Made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning
the First Instalment of Palestinian "Late Claims "for Damages up to USD 100,000 (Category
"C" Claims), 1, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/2003/26 (Dec. 18, 2003). The Commission also ac-
cepted 31,868 claims after the filing deadline under a special program for Bedouns. See
Bedoun Decision, supra note 21; Status of Processing, supra note 24, n.2.
39 Status of Processing, supra note 24. The payment of compensation awards was never made
directly from the Commission to the individual claimants. Individual claimants submitted
their claims to the Commission through their governments (or, in some cases, through interna-
tional organizations), and the awards of compensation were paid by the Commission to the
submitting governments or organizations, which in turn were responsible for paying the suc-
cessful claimants. See Payment Procedure, supra note 7. The recipient governments and or-
ganizations were required to provide accountings to the Commission to verify the payments to
the claimants. Id.
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form supplied by the Commission. However, the realities of preparing a
claim were anything but simple. In fact, the individual claimants were faced
with difficult challenges in their attempts to support their claims. There has
been little discussion in the commentary surrounding the Commission of
these difficulties, but they must be highlighted in order to understand the
hard choices the Commission faced in structuring the claims review process.
One significant difficulty was the fact that in many instances the indi-
vidual claimants, through no fault of their own, did not have the means to
support their claims. The individual claimants were civilians who found
themselves in an active war zone. The Category C Panel noted the problems
that faced these claimants in preparing claims for losses. The invasion took
place at the height of summer when many Kuwaitis were on vacation
abroad.4 ° Such persons would have had no reason to have documentation
with them to support their claims for losses. 4 Further, the looting, vandal-
ism, and destruction of property in Kuwait was extensive, and many homes
were gutted or left in complete disarray. 4' Thus, some or all of the docu-
ments and other forms of proof to substantiate a claim were looted, de-
stroyed, or were lost during the efforts to clean up the damage and debris.
43
The Category D Panel similarly observed that given the difficult cir-
cumstances caused by the invasion and occupation of Kuwait, claimants
could not, and could not be expected to, document all aspects of their
claims. 44 The Panel acknowledged that in many cases, relevant documents
did not exist, had been destroyed, or were left behind by claimants who fled
Kuwait or Iraq.45
The Category B Panel (death claims) attributed the "scarcity of eviden-
tiary support" to the circumstances in Kuwait and Iraq during the invasion
and occupation.46 Echoing the comments of the other panels, the Category B
Panel acknowledged that thousands were forced to flee or hide, or were held
captive, while others chose not to or could not return.47 Given the general
emergency conditions, it did not surprise the Panel that individual claimants
would not have primary evidence of their losses, damages, or injuries.48
40 Category "C" Report, supra note 16, at 27.
41 id.
42 m.
43 Id.
44 Category "D " Report, supra note 31, 72.
45 id.
46 See Category "B " Report, supra note 29, at 33-34.
47 Id.
48 Id.
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Of particular significance to the Category B Panel was the absence of
medical records in many instances.49 Large numbers of doctors, nurses and
hospital administrative staff had to flee Kuwait in the aftermath of the inva-
sion, and hospital administrative services were forced to operate much below
their normal capacity. 50 Accordingly, the contemporaneous preparation of
doctor's reports, medical certificates and records, or death certificates was
severely limited, and in a significant number of cases medical reports did not
exist or records were lost.
51
The Category C Panel also discussed the effects of the collapse of the
health care system. Like the Category B claimants, many individual claim-
ants in Category C were unable to provide documentation of personal inju-
ries prepared by health care professionals.5 2 The Category C Report noted
that in many instances, doctors were forced to treat patients outside of the
medical facilities because the facilities were inaccessible due to a lack of
ambulance services. Under the emergency conditions, few doctors were
concerned with preparing medical records. 54 In other instances, the Iraqi au-
thorities had issued arrest warrants for persons who also needed medical at-
tention, and doctors generally did not prepare medical records for such pa-
tients. 55 Another set of issues was raised by those who had been injured
during the course of detention by Iraqi authorities (including injuries suf-
fered as a result of torture) and by those who had been injured while in hid-
ing. 56 Not surprisingly, such injuries were not the subject of contemporane-
ous medical documentation.57
In addition to the problems of proving death and personal injury claims,
individuals also faced difficulty in proving personal property losses. The
Category C Panel summarized the situation as follows:
First, to the extent that claimants kept relevant records, in the majority
of instances it appears that these records were destroyed or lost during the
looting that accompanied the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Second, large num-
bers of claimants left Kuwait and Iraq under urgent circumstances. At the
time of their departure it is unlikely that they would have had the foresight,
49 id.
50 Id.
51 id.
52 See Category "C" Report, supra note 16, at 109.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 id.
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wherewithal or concern to collect and carry documentation, to the extent that
they possessed any, relevant to establishing their future claim. Third, many
claimants were outside of Kuwait and Iraq when the invasion occurred.
These persons are unlikely to have had documentation relevant to their claim
in their possessions. Fourth, of the expatriates who left Kuwait and Iraq, a
very large number have not returned to these countries, and thus, are unable
to provide primary evidence in support of their losses. Fifth, Kuwaitis and
expatriates who have returned, often could not gather any form of tangible
evidence in support of their losses, such evidence having been lost in the
massive clean-up effort that took place in Kuwait following the withdrawal
of Iraqi troops.58
The Panels' respective reports describe a situation of wartime chaos in
which civilians were thrust into life-and-death situations while the infrastruc-
ture of their surroundings was being destroyed. These same civilians would
later be given an opportunity to seek compensation for their losses through
the Commission's proceedings. However, in many instances, they would be
faced with the challenge of proving losses without primary evidence.
The approval of Resolution 687 reaffirming Iraq's liability under inter-
national law for injuries and loss inflicted relieved claimants "from the oth-
erwise heavy burden of proving the liability of a sovereign state. ' 59 How-
ever, each claimant was still faced with the burden of demonstrating to his or
her panel of Commissioners the circumstances surrounding the loss (i.e.,
whether the loss was a direct result of Iraq's invasion and occupation of Ku-
wait) and the actual amount of loss. 60 This was undeniably a major problem
for the individual claimants-many of whom had lost everything, including
the ability to prove their loss.
" Id. at 141.
59 Kazazi, supra note 19, at 221; see also Bederman, supra note 13, at 19 (Security Council
Resolution 687 "obviated the need for claimant countries [and claimants] to litigate whether
there had been a predicate act implicating Iraq's state responsibility").
6
o See Category "C" Report, supra note 16; see also Category "D " Report, supra note 31,
73; Kazazi, supra note 19, at 221. Although set in the context of discussing a large corporate
claim, one commentator's description of the standards of proof for supporting a claim is also
relevant:
There are three preliminary questions of law that the panels must decide prior to
moving to the next stage of its inquiry into the compensability of the claims.
First, does the claim meet the minimum pleading and evidentiary standards set
forth in the Rules? Second, does the asserted loss fall within the Commission's
jurisdictional grant in Resolution 687? Third, does the asserted loss meet the
Governing Council's criteria for compensation?
O'Brien, supra note 21, at 15-16 (the reference to the Rules is to the Provisional Rules for
Claims Procedure, see Rules, supra note 12).
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B. The Challenges Faced by the Government of Iraq
The individual claimants were not the only parties who found it difficult
to prove the facts of their situation. The Government of Iraq faced similar
problems. It was charged with liability for millions of individual claims.
However, the Government of Iraq was liable for only the damage that it
caused, and had no obligation to pay for any other damage. The problem,
however, was that it was not in a position to provide evidence in support of
its defense. Indeed, according to two observers, "in most cases Iraq [had] no
particular knowledge of the loss that was suffered allegedly as a result of its
invasion and occupation of Kuwait." 61 This contention makes intuitive sense.
An official representative of the Government of Iraq would have no way of
knowing which particular civilian individuals in Kuwait might have been the
subject of Iraqi aggression, or which particular Iraqi military personnel
might have been involved in causing injury or damage to any particular ci-
vilian. Moreover, it is unlikely that a member of Iraq's armed forces would
admit to his government that he was involved in a particular act causing in-
jury or loss to a civilian, especially if a war crime may have been committed.
Thus, Iraq was in a situation where it lacked the evidentiary foundation to
rebut claims by individuals that its forces caused damage to them.
In addition to these problems of an evidentiary nature, Iraq faced chal-
lenges within the framework of the claims resolution process due to its status
as the defeated, aggressor nation. As one commentator observed, "[t]he fact
is that Iraqi claims will be processed by individuals whom Iraq has had no
role in choosing, and whose decisions will be reviewable by an organ that is
the alter-ego of the Security Council which waged war against Iraq., 62
Moreover, Iraq was not a member of the Governing Council and none of its
citizens was appointed as a Commissioner or even as a member of the secre-
tariat.63
61 Caron and Morris, supra note 36, at 192.
62 Bederman, supra note 13, at 15; see also Garmise, supra note 21, at 874 (noting that Iraq
had "been excluded from the planning of the claims system.").
Iraq's situation led to pointed criticism that the Commission might serve as a mere "rubber
stamp" for the approval of claims. Garmise, supra note 21, at 870; see also Wdihler, supra
note 8, at 271 (recognizing concern that the Commission might be viewed as an instrument of
"victor's justice"). The criticisms were based on concerns that unjust awards would "unjustly
punish future generations of Iraqi citizens for the recent actions of its leaders." Garmise, su-
pra note 21, at 842. The Commission and the Commissioners were no doubt aware of such
criticisms, which would have heightened the need to achieve the proper balancing of rights
between claimants and the Government of Iraq.
63 Bederman, supra note 13, at 10. These apparent concerns were noted by one commentator:
"To begin with alleged procedural flaws, the main criticism concerns Iraq's lack of standing
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Perhaps of most significance to Iraq's ability to defend itself was the
fact that its involvement in the process for the evaluation of claims was lim-
ited. As stated by the Category D Panel: "The Panel is also mindful that the
Government of Iraq has, under the Rules, limited procedural opportunities to
put its case and make submissions. 64 An examination of the Rules demon-
strates this point. Article 35 of the Rules explicitly addresses the nature and
type of evidence to be submitted by claimants. 65 There is no provision in Ar-
ticle 35, however, that explicitly addresses submission of evidence by Iraq.
The only provision that could arguably provide for Iraq's right in this regard
is Article 36, entitled "Additional Information," which states:
A panel of Commissioners may:
in unusually large or complex cases, request further written submis-
sions and invite individuals, corporations or other entities, Govern-
ments or international organizations to present their views in oral
proceedings;
request additional information from any other source, including ex-
pert advice, as necessary.
66
in the UNCC. This is obviously a very sensitive matter, as it deals with fundamental values
of fairness and due process." Gattini, supra note 10, at 168. Iraq's lawyer used stronger lan-
guage to describe the Commission:
To sum up, the UNCC system is fundamentally flawed: it is a system created by
a political body without the consent of the State concerned. It determines the re-
sponsibility of a sovereign State by reference to rules fixed by this political body
in the absence of the debtor State; it applies these rules in a procedure in which
this State has no proper standing and is deprived of its natural rights of defence;
and it makes decisions in an obscure process where the responsibilities of the
Secretariat, the Panels and the Governing Council are indistinguishably con-
fused.
Michael E. Schneider, How Fair and Efficient Is the UNCC System? A Model to Emulate?, J.
INT'L ARB. 15(1) (1998) (containing a strongly-worded critique of the Commission).
64 Category "D " Report, supra note 31, 76.
65 See Rules, supra note 12, art. 35(1), which states: "Each claimant is responsible for submit-
ting documents and other evidence which demonstrate satisfactorily that a particular claim or
group of claims is eligible for compensation pursuant to Security Council resolution 687
(1991). Each panel will determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any
documents and other evidence submitted."
66 Id. art. 36. "Unusually large or complex" claims in Category D included claims seeking
more than $10 million in compensation. See U.N. Compensation Commission, Governing
Council, Report and Recommendations Made by the "D2" Panel of Commissioners Concern-
ing Part Three of the Eighteenth Instalment of Individual Claims for Damages Above USD
100,000 (Category "D" Claims), 4, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/2004/10 (Sep. 23, 2004).
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There are two significant features in the drafting of Article 36. The first
is the use of "may" in the opening phrase. The second is that Iraq is not spe-
cifically mentioned. In other words, Iraq's right to participate was at the dis-
cretion of the Commissioners, and Iraq had no greater rights than other enti-
ties or governments.
The silence of the Governing Council in addressing the Government of
Iraq's right to submit evidence dictated the practice of the Commissioners.
Claims filed in Categories A, B and C were not sent to Iraq for its re-
sponse. 67 As for Category D claims, only claims that were considered "un-
usually large or complex" (which were relatively few in number) were sent
to Iraq for its response.68 Thus, the policies governing the work of the Com-
mission and the actual practice demonstrate that the meaning of "limited"
involvement by Iraq meant that Iraq did not have an opportunity to review or
respond to the vast majority of individual claims.69
67 The Governing Council set forth the specific policies and procedures for the review of
claims in Categories A, B, and C, and the sending of these claims to Iraq for its response was
not required. See Criteria for Expedited Processing, supra note 32; see also Rules, supra note
12, art. 35(2). Pursuant to these guidelines, such claims were not sent to Iraq.
68 See, e.g., U.N. Compensation Commission, Governing Council, Report and Recommenda-
tions Made by the "D1" Panel of Commissioners Concerning Part Three of the Nineteenth
Instalment of Individual Claims for Damages Above USD 100,000 (Category "D" Claims),
5, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/2004/11 (Sep. 23, 2004). One example of a Category D claim that was
sent to the Government of Iraq for its review and response was a claim for millions of dollars
in the 19"h instalment. See U.N. Compensation Commission, Governing Council, Report and
Recommendations Made by the "DI " Panel of Commissioners Concerning Part Two of the
Nineteenth Instalment of Individual Claims for Damages above USD 100, 000 (Category "D "
Claims), 25-38, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/2004/6 (July 2, 2004). This claim demonstrates that it
is not universally true that Iraq was unable to provide a specific response to every individual
claim. In this instance, Iraq was given an opportunity to review and respond to the claim, and
was invited to appear at an oral proceeding on the claim. Id. Iraq responded to the claim and
appeared at the oral proceeding. Id. The claim was awarded nothing by the Panel. Id. The
claim arose out of a commercial relationship with Iraq prior to the invasion of Kuwait. Thus,
Iraq apparently had knowledge of the facts underlying the claim by virtue of its status as a
commercial counter-party. The fact that this claim arose out of a contractual relationship puts
it in a different posture from the vast majority of other claims, which arose out of conduct that
can be characterized as criminal or tortious on Iraq's part. Cf Merritt B. Fox, Imposing Li-
ability for Losses from Aggressive War: An Economic Analysis of the UN Compensation
Commission, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 201 (2002) (U.K.) (suggesting the relevance and applicabil-
ity of an analytical framework designed for intentional torts to the conduct of Iraq).
69 There were claims, however, where Iraq's participation was much more involved, including
the claim described in note 68. Such claims were more typically found in the categories re-
served for corporations and governments. For example, several governments of neighboring
countries filed claims for environmental damage seeking compensation in the aggregate
amount of almost $50 billion, and Iraq actively participated in the process through responsive
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C. The Challenges Faced by the Commission
As outlined above, before the first claim was even decided, the Com-
mission was confronted, on the one hand, with cases in which numerous in-
dividuals who had suffered undeniable losses might not be able to prove
their claims, and, on the other hand, the situation of the Government of Iraq,
which was not in a position to rebut the claims before a commission that had
been imposed on it.70 Thus, the Commission was required at the outset to de-
fine a procedure that would achieve a balance in the claims review procedure
that would adequately protect the respective rights involved.7 ' According to
Professor David Caron, a former Commissioner, the Commission "knew that
delivering individualized due process on two million claims would not be
possible. It also knew that a deliberative process was required. Its challenge
thus was to find neither rough justice nor perfect justice, but rather practical
justice., 72
The Security Council was aware from the outset of the need for a delib-
erative process, as reflected in the May 2, 1991, report of the Secretary-
General to the Security Council, in which he stated that "[g]iven the nature
of the Commission, it is all the more important that some element of due
process be built into the procedure. It will be the function of the commis-
sioners to provide this element. 7 3 The Commissioners themselves were also
mindful of and expressly recognized the balance they would need to achieve:
The Panel views its role as balancing the interests of claimants flee-
ing a war zone often under difficult circumstances and who are there-
papers and appearances at oral hearings. See U.N. Compensation Commission, Governing
Council, Report and Recommendations Made by the Panel of Commissioners concerning the
Fifth Instalment of "F4 " Claims, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/2005/10 (June 30, 2005).
70 One commentator described the issue as "the question of how much participation in the
process that adjudicates such claims need be given a state guilty of aggressive war for the
standards of minimal procedural fairness to be met." Fox, supra note 68, at 202. Another
commentator described the situation in the following manner:
[T]he establishment of the UNCC did not have as a goal the sanctioning of Iraq,
but rather the effective handling of millions of claims by establishing a regime
which could at one and the same time do justice to the rights of the injured and
take into account the needs of Iraq's people.
Gattini, supra note 10, at 164.
71 The Commissioners also had to develop their approach with due regard to time. They were
required to strike the proper balance "between the search for individual justice and fairness
and the requirement of an expedient process that resolves the whole claims population within
a reasonable time period." Wfihler, supra note 8, at 265-66.
72 Caron, United Nations Compensation Commission, supra note 2, at 316.
7' Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 9, 20, at 7.
160 10 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 141 (2005)
fore in many cases unable to submit extensive evidence to document
legitimate claims, with the interests of the Government of Iraq,
which is only liable for damage and loss caused as a direct result of
the invasion and occupation of Kuwait.
74
D. The Results Achieved by the Commission
By many accounts, the Commissioners deciding the individual claims
were able to balance the rights of the individual claimants and the Govern-
ment of Iraq to accomplish the goal of compensating losses that were the di-
rect result of Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Professor Caron has
remarked that:
The first phase of the UNCC's work is one of the most significant
and underreported success stories of the United Nations. Over two
and a half million A, B and C claims were filed. The merits of all of
these claims were determined and all the monies awarded were paid
to the individual claimants within less than 10 years after the libera-
tion of Kuwait. The guiding principle to the approach taken by the
UNCC to the A, B and C claims was one of 'practical justice:' that
is, a justice that would be swift and efficient, yet not rough. The
Commission placed these claims on a fast track, resolving them
through 'mass claims processing' techniques, including clearly de-
fined evidentiary standards and fixed amounts of damage for various
forms of injury. Large numbers of individuals suffered the greatest
and most direct losses as a result of Iraq's invasion and occupation of
Kuwait and the dire situation in which many of those individuals
found themselves demanded swift action. The Commission's re-
sponse was appropriate and is an unparalleled success in the history
of claims resolution.
75
Professor Caron more recently noted: "The UNCC's resolution of hu-
manitarian claims in Phase One was a major accomplishment. Just about
every person seriously hurt by the conflict in the region received some assis-
tance in getting back on their feet. It was a huge success for the U.N. and is
what the organization is all about.,
7 6
With regard to Category A claims in particular, the first Executive Sec-
retary of the Commission observed:
74 Category "D" Report, supra note 31, 76.
75 Caron and Morris, supra note 36, at 187-88.
76 Caron, United Nations Compensation Commission, supra note 2, at 320.
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For the first time in the history of international compensation institu-
tions and procedures, the interest of the individual was given priority
over that of businesses or even governments. There is, indeed, a dis-
tressing problem here, which affects more than a million people,
mostly workers from Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka,
Bangladesh, and the Philippines, who had to leave Iraq or Kuwait
precipitately, losing all they possessed-personal belongings, savings,
work and hope for a better life-and return to their countries of origin,
further aggravating those countries' economic and social problems.
77
He went on to state that the awarded amounts "might appear very small
to Western eyes, but may make all the difference when a person has lost eve-
rything and has to start from nothing in a small town in Sri Lanka or Bang-
ladesh. '
78
Given the significant challenges in constructing a fair and time-sensitive
framework for the resolution of the individual claims, it is worth focusing
attention on the features of the framework that enabled the results. The re-
sults were achieved through deliberate policy choices regarding basic issues
of procedure and proof. The next section examines two key features of the
Commission's framework.
Il. THE FRAMEWORK AND METHODS USED TO PROTECT THE
INTERESTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL CLAIMANTS AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ
The Commission could have proceeded down a variety of paths as it es-
tablished its framework, but it had to make crucial choices to achieve a result
that was fair, both substantively and procedurally. In order to protect the in-
terests of the individual claimants and the Government of Iraq, the Commis-
sion needed to resolve the following issues: (1) whether the Commission's
procedures would be based on an inquisitorial or adversarial model; (2) the
extent to which the claimant and the Government of Iraq would be involved
in the procedure; (3) to what extent the process would rely on evidence be-
yond the submission of documents by the claimants and Iraq; and (4) the es-
tablishment of the appropriate level of evidentiary standards and rules. 79 This
article concludes that in assessing the merits of the procedures and frame-
work implemented by the Commissioners in deciding individual claims, two
77 Carlos Alzamora, The U.N. Compensation Commission: An Overview, in THE UNITED
NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION: THIRTEENTH SOKOL COLLOQUIUM 1, 6 (R.B. Lillich
ed., 1995).
78 Id.
79 Widhter, supra note 8, at 267.
important and interrelated features deserve particular attention: (A) the use
of an inquisitorial process to resolve the claims, as opposed to an adversarial
process, and (B) the reliance on fact-finding reports prepared by disinter-
ested third parties to establish an evidentiary foundation for individual
claims.
A. The Use of an Inquisitorial Process
One of the crucial choices the Commission made was to employ an in-
quisitorial process instead of an adversarial one. Dr. Wiihler explained:
"There is no adversarial process; rather it is the responsibility of the Com-
mission, and in particular the Commissioner panels, to establish the facts and
evaluate the claims, and it is up to the panels to seek the information and
documentation required. As such, the process is inquisitorial., 80 In this
process, the Commissioners assumed an active investigative and fact-finding
role in reviewing and verifying claims that went beyond the role of judges in
traditional types of adversarial proceedings. 81 The Category D Panel de-
scribed its role by noting that "the Commission is not an arbitral tribunal be-
fore which parties appear; rather it performs an essentially fact-finding func-
tion of examining and verifying claims and evaluating the quantum of
losses. 82
The use of an inquisitorial type of procedure for the claim resolution
process has been described as the "signal distinction" of the Commission.83
Clearly, given the large number of claims, the use of an adversarial process
would have been impractical. 84 Even putting to one side the logistical im-
practicalities, an adversarial process would not have been able to achieve
fundamental fairness for the individual claimants or Iraq. An adversarial
system would have likely resulted in patently unfair outcomes due to deci-
sions based primarily on technical grounds, rather than the substantive merit
of the claims.
80 Id. "With Iraq's legal responsibility and liability established by the Security Council and
accepted by Iraq, the UNCC is not a court or tribunal with an elaborate adversarial process.
And considering the number of claims, it could not perform such a function in a reasonable
time and at justifiable cost." Id. at 261.
81 Mojtaba Kazazi, Environmental Damage in the Practice of the UN Compensation Commis-
sion, in ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW - PROBLEMS OF
DEFINITION AND VALUATION, 114 (Michael Bowman & Alan Boyle eds., 2002).
82 Category "D" Report, supra note 31, 71, at 21.
83 Bederman, supra note 13, at 15.
84 Caron and Morris, supra note 36, at 191 (noting that case-by-case adjudication would be
impractical given the number of claims). This point is especially true in light of the Commis-
sion's need to act with a "due regard to time." See supra note 71.
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An adversarial system could have resulted in the denial of individual
claims due to the failure of individual claimants to provide evidence to sup-
port their claims. This point can be illustrated by the following hypothetical
scene in an adversarial proceeding:
A Kuwaiti claimant testifies in a judicial tribunal that shefled to her sis-
ter's house on August 2, 1990 upon hearing of the invasion, and hid there
for 30 days. Upon returning to her house, she found that it had been set on
fire and all her personal property was missing. She seeks compensation for
her losses.
Iraq's Lawyer begins his cross-examination.
Iraq's Lawyer: "Were you at your house when it was allegedly set on fire?"
Claimant: "No. As I said, I was hiding at my sister's house."
Iraq's Lawyer: "Were you at your house when your property was allegedly
stolen?"
Claimant: "No. I just told you why."
Iraq's Lawyer: "So you didn't see who set fire to your house, correct?"
Claimant: "Yes, that's right."
Iraq's Lawyer: "And you didn't see who stole your property, correct?"
Claimant: "Yes."
Iraq's Lawyer: "More specifically, you didn't see any Iraqi troops set fire to
your house, isn't that correct?"
Claimant: "Yes, but we all know they did it."
Iraq's Lawyer: "Please, it's a simple yes or no question. Did you see any
Iraqi troops set fire to your house?"
Claimant: "No."
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Iraq's Lawyer: "Did you see any Iraqi troops steal your property?"
Claimant: "No."
Iraq's Lawyer: "Have you brought anyone here with you today who is go-
ing to testify that they saw Iraqi troops set fire to your house
or steal your property?"
Claimant: "No. My neighbors fled like me or were killed by your client."
Iraq's Lawyer: "Move to strike everything after 'no,' Your Honor."
Court: "Granted."
Iraq's Lawyer: "Your Honor, at this time, we move to dismiss these claims
for failure to establish an essential element of the claim-
namely, that Iraq caused the loss."
Court: "Granted. Claim dismissed.,
85
85 Section Ill.B, infra, discusses how the Panels actually addressed this problem of proving
causation.
Admittedly, this hypothetical is an oversimplified example of the claimant's burden. It
does not reflect that Iraq was liable for damages resulting from "the breakdown of civil order
in Kuwait" following the invasion. See Criteria for Expedited Processing, supra note 32,
18, at 4; see also John R. Crook, The United Nations Compensation Commission - A New
Structure to Enforce State Responsibility, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 144, 149 (1993) ("[a] belligerent
has particular duties to maintain law and order in territory it occupies.") (citing Hague Con-
vention (No. IV) Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277,
1 Bevans 631). Thus, returning to the hypothetical, it could be argued that the claimant need
not establish that it was Iraqi troops who were the cause of her losses. It could be argued that
the specific identity of the culprits is immaterial because it was all due to a breakdown in civil
order under Iraqi occupation.
However, even if this were the case, how would the claimant prove the breakdown of
civil order? Would she need to provide evidence of the situation in her neighborhood before
the invasion? Would she need to show the condition of her neighbors' houses to demonstrate
that her losses were the result of a breakdown of general civil order, as opposed to a targeted
attack on her house? Would she need to prove Iraqi authorities made no effort to stop the de-
struction? If the answer is yes to these questions, how would an individual claimant go about
doing so? These issues demonstrate that the burdens imposed by an adversarial system may
have been too onerous to overcome by an individual claimant, despite the merits of the claim.
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As this hypothetical shows, even though the parties may have "known"
that the damage was caused by Iraq, in an adversarial system "knowing"
something and "proving" it are two entirely different matters. In an adver-
sarial procedure, individuals' claims might have been rejected on grounds
unrelated to the substantive merits. Moreover, Iraq might have prevailed due
to its destruction of the claimants' ability to prove their claims, thus unjustly
benefiting from the acts that gave rise to its liability in the first place.
An alternative hypothetical scenario might have unfairly prejudiced
Iraq. In recognition of the plight of the individual claimants, the tribunal in
an adversarial system could have decided that the issue of causation was a
rebuttable presumption in favor of the claimants, with the burden on Iraq to
show that it did not cause the claimed losses. The likely result would have
been that Iraq would be unable to respond in any meaningful way because it
would have no evidence that its troops were either involved or not involved
in any particular act of destruction, with respect to any particular individual.
Thus, Iraq's inability to defend itself would have been the basis for liabil-
ity-again, a ground for decision unrelated to the substantive merits.
This hypothetical also does not take into account the possibility of an American-style
class action suit or the possibility of findings based on representative samplings of claimants
(which were discussed by the Category A Panel in the context of precedential examples of
sampling methodologies to be applied to certain Category A claims). See Fourth Category A
Report, supra note 36, 11-34. However, the need for a class action or a representative
sampling to remedy the plight of an individual claimant emphasizes the fact that any given
individual would not be able to establish the necessary factual record.
This need also highlights the benefits of an inquisitorial system over an adversarial sys-
tem in this instance. The adversarial system would need a well-organized claimants' bar mo-
tivated by monetary compensation with significant resources (both financial and logistical) to
document events in a war zone. Iraq, in turn, would have to be given the opportunity to pre-
pare its own documentation of events in response. Such a situation would either result in a
tremendous incurring of expenses by both sides, or the inability of one side or the other to
prepare an adequate documentation-thereby leading to a decision based on a party's inability
to prosecute or defend, a non-substantive result. The combination of UN fact-finding and the
inquisitorial process of the Commission was able to supply this documentation and lead to
decisions based on the merits (as further discussed below).
Additionally, in an American-style class action, how would a class be defined and how
many classes would there be? One for people who hid, another for people who fled, another
for those taken hostage, another for Kuwaitis who were specifically targeted by Iraq, another
for those with personal injuries, and yet another for those whose relative was killed? What
would be the plight of an individual claimant if he or she did not fit into a class? Any use of
an adversarial type of proceeding would raise a multitude of thorny issues that are beyond the
scope of this article-not least of which is the fact that class action-styles of lawsuit have
been rejected by many of the world's advanced legal systems. See generally Michele Taruffo,
Some Remarks on Group Litigation in Comparative Perspective, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
405, 413 (2001) (discussing resistance to group litigation and its possible sources).
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In contrast to this hypothetical situation, the Panels in fact regularly
acted in a manner to protect Iraq's interests and denied non-meritorious
claims on the merits. Furthermore, Iraq's inability to respond was never a
factor in the actual practice of the Panels. For example, the Category D
Panel rejected numerous claims on the merits as a matter of ordinary prac-
tice, even though Iraq was not in a position to contest the merits.86 As noted
by Professor Caron, such decisions by the Commissioners exemplify "the
important function the UNCC has played in both identifying unsubstantiated
claims and reducing the amount of damages sought by particular claims. 87
This observation is supported by the statistics. Over 1 million Category C
claims received no compensation.88 The amount awarded for Category C
claims was approximately $6 billion less than the amount sought, or, to put it
another way, the award was approximately 45% of the amount sought. 89 The
amount awarded for Category D claims was approximately $13 billion less
than the amount sought, and was approximately 20% of the amount sought.90
In reality, neither the claimants nor Iraq were in a position to present a
complete factual showing in support of their positions due to the chaos and
destruction of the wartime circumstances. The inquisitorial type of process
remedied the situation by empowering the Commissioners to engage in their
own fact-finding. The panels had the authority to develop the factual record
through the hiring of experts, and they exercised that authority. 91 The Cate-
gories A, B, and C Panels sought and received expert advice from medical
doctors, labor law experts, statisticians and other experts. 92 The Commis-
sioners also authorized technical fact-finding missions to Kuwait and other
countries to investigate individual claims.93 By using this authority to engage
86 See, e.g., U.N. Compensation Commission, Governing Council, Report and Recommenda-
tions Made by the "D1 " Panel of Commissioners Concerning Part One of the Ninth Instal-
ment of Individual Claims for Damages above USD 100,000 (Category "D" Claims), 15-
20, at 6-8, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/2001/10 (June 22, 2001).
87 David D. Caron, The Reconstruction ofIraq: Dealing with Debt, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L.
&POL'Y 123, 135 (2004).
88 See Table 2 supra p. 152. Claims received no compensation for numerous reasons, such as
the failure to establish causation or the fact of loss.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 See Kazazi, supra note 19, at 224.
92 Id. See, e.g., Category "C" Report, supra note 16, at 272, which lists some of the experts
who advised the Panel. In Category B, the Panel hired a medical doctor to conduct a prelimi-
nary examination of the claims. See Category "B" Report, supra note 29, at 9.
93 See, e.g., U.N. Compensation Commission, Governing Council, Report and Recommenda-
tions Made by the "D1" Panel of Commissioners Concerning Part One of the Nineteenth In-
stalment of Individual Claims for Damages above USD 100,000 (Category "D" Claims),
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in fact-finding, the Commissioners were able to supplement the factual re-
cord and develop facts that the claimants and Iraq were unable to provide.
This inquisitorial type of process served the interests of both the indi-
vidual claimants and the Government of Iraq. Professor Gattini summed up
this view by stating: "Until now, it has not been sufficiently noted that the
UN management of Iraqi war reparations is as much a guarantee of Iraq's
interests as of those of the claimants, in that it deals with masses of poten-
tially disruptive claims in an impartial and orderly manner.,
94
B. The Use of Fact-Finding Reports Prepared by Disinterested Third
Parties to Establish an Evidentiary Foundation for Individual Claims
Shortly after the liberation of Kuwait but before any claims were sub-
mitted, the UN commissioned several fact-finding studies ("Background Re-
ports") to report on the conditions in Kuwait in the aftermath of war. Few,
if any, commentators have discussed the importance of these reports in es-
tablishing the factual record for the Commission. Nonetheless, the studies
constituted an essential part of the record and provided the necessary factual
foundation that enabled the Panels to reach their decisions.
The Background Reports have been singled out in this article because
they were heavily and repeatedly relied upon by the Panels for Categories A,
18, at 6, 24, at 7, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/2003/27 (Dec. 18, 2003).
94 Gattini, supra note 10, at 164.
95 See Category "D" Report, supra note 31, 21, at 10.
The Background Reports include:
(a) 'Report to the Secretary-General on Humanitarian needs in Kuwait in the
immediate post-crisis environment by a mission to the area led by Mr. Martti
Ahtisaari, Under-Secretary General for administration and management'
(S/22409) (the 'Ahtisaari Report'); (b) 'Report to the Secretary-General by a
United Nations mission, led by Mr. Abdulrahim A. Farah, former Under-
Secretary General, assessing the scope and nature of damage inflicted on Ku-
wait's infrastructure during the Iraqi occupation of the country from 2 August
1990 to 27 February 1991' (S/22535) (the 'Farah Report'); (c) 'Interim Report to
the Secretary-General by the United Nations mission led by Mr. Abdulrahim A.
Farah, former Under-Secretary General, assessing the losses of life incurred dur-
ing the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait as well as Iraqi practices against the civilian
population in Kuwait' (S/22536) (the 'Interim Farah Report') .... (e) 'Report
on the situation of human rights in Kuwait under Iraqi occupation, prepared by
Mr. Walter Kalin, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, in
accordance with Commission resolution 1991/67' (E/CN.4/1992/26) (the 'Kalin
Report').
Id. at 72 n.6.
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B, C, and D to establish the factual record for their decisions.96 They estab-
lished the factual and evidentiary foundations for the claims for departure
costs, 97 deaths,98 personal injuries99 and loss of personal property. 100 The
Category C Panel cited the Kalin Report as "the principal source of facts for
the Panel's deliberations" for claims involving hostage taking, illegal deten-
tion and forced hiding.1° 1 In reviewing claims for personal injury, the same
Panel stated that the "lack of specific information characterizing such [per-
96 See Category "A " Report, supra note 27, at 24 n.26; Category "B" Report, supra note 29,
at 11 n. 17; Category "C" Report, supra note 16, at 60 n. 129, 98 n. 172.
97 See Category "A "Report, supra note 27, at 23 & n.26.
98 See Category "C" Report, supra note 16, at 116 & n.221.
99 "Even if the exact number may not be certain, the injuries suffered as a result of Iraq's in-
vasion and occupation of Kuwait have been extensively documented in United Nations-
sponsored reports .... " Id. at 98 (citing each of the Background Reports). Moreover, accord-
ing to the Commissioners:
Thousands of civilians were arrested during the occupation, a substantial number
of whom were taken to Iraq. Many detainees suffered injuries as a result of tor-
ture. Noting that 35 of the 47 detention sites throughout Kuwait were used for
torture, the Kalin Report concludes that 'torture and cruel, inhuman and degrad-
ing treatment were systematically used during interrogations of those arrested
during the ongoing occupation.'
Id. at 99 (footnotes omitted).
Many persons, most of whom were women, were raped by Iraqis. Such inci-
dents fell into several categories: rapes of foreign women in the first two weeks
of the occupation; rapes of women during house searches, sometimes in front of
relatives; rapes of women abducted for that purpose from the street; rapes suf-
fered as individuals sought to leave Iraq or Kuwait and passed through check-
points; and rapes inflicted as a means of torture, including torture of those who
were required to watch.
Id. at 99-100 (citing the Kalin Report).
100 The Commissioners noted:
According to several reports, the main causes of personal property losses in Ku-
wait were the looting and vandalism of personal and real property by members
of the Iraqi occupying forces, pursuant to official orders, as well as unofficially.
The [Background Reports] state that the seizure and destruction of private and
public property -- particularly from warehouses, government ministries, public
buildings, factories, plant sites and private residences of well-known Kuwaitis --
was carried out under specific plans and orders issued by the Iraqi authorities.
The more indiscriminate looting and vandalism of property, accounting for the
bulk of personal property losses, is reported to have taken place at the 'unoffi-
cial' level. According to the [Background Reports], Iraqi soldiers on patrol and
conducting door-to-door searches systematically ransacked entire neighbour-
hoods.
Id. at 132 (footnotes omitted).
"' Id. at 82 n.138.
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sonal injury] claims is placed in context by the findings in the Kalin Report,"
which "lends additional credibility to the assertions made by the claim-
ants. 1 °2 For personal property losses, the Category C Panel stated that
"[r]egarding the facts relevant to the main causes of personal property losses
in Kuwait and Iraq as a result of Iraq's invasion and occupation, the Panel
relied principally on the following United Nations-sponsored reports: Ahti-
saari Report, Kalin Report, [and the] Farah Report. 10 3 The importance of the
Background Reports was also highlighted by the Category D Panel, which
stated that "the Background Reports ... represent in themselves significant
documentary evidence of the circumstances of the losses claimed and also
provide the background within which to consider the evidence for the
amount claimed."' 1 4 Indeed, the Category D Panel expressly stated that they
were of "critical importance."'
10 5
An important feature of the Background Reports was their preparation
under the authority of the UN. They were not prepared by Kuwait, the direct
object of the aggression, or on behalf of any other nation. They were the
product of fact-finding missions by disinterested third parties. In addition,
the reports were prepared contemporaneously with the underlying events-
in the time immediately after the expulsion of Iraqi forces, when the destruc-
tion was being documented and catalogued.1
0 6
The Background Reports established key portions of the factual founda-
tion for the individual claims that the claimants were unable to provide
themselves. As reflected by the Commissioners' own statements in their re-
ports, a particularly significant effect of the Background Reports was that
they established the factual foundation for the finding of causation between
the individuals' losses and Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait.
More specifically, the Background Reports enabled the Commissioners
to relax the evidentiary standards for individual claimants on a principled ba-
sis, a necessary feature of mass claims processing. The need for the relaxa-
tion of the standards was specifically discussed by the Category C Panel:
102 Id. at 109.
103 Id. at 132 n.258.
104 Category "D" Report, supra note 31, 73, at 22.
'
5 Id. 21, at 10.
106 The Background Reports were not the only reports that the Commissioners relied upon.
See, e.g., Category "C" Report, supra note 16, at 59 n. 129 (listing other reports, including
reports prepared by the International Labour Office and the International Organisation for
Migration). However, the Background Reports were singled out by the Commissioners for
their significance.
[T]he scarcity of evidentiary support where massive numbers of
claims are involved is not a phenomenon without precedent in inter-
national claims programmes, in particular if the events generating re-
sponsibility have taken place in abnormal circumstances such as
those prevailing in Kuwait and Iraq during the conflict. As one au-
thority summarized:
An analysis of the practice of international tribunals re-
garding issues of evidence shows that tribunals often had
to decide claims on the basis of meagre or incomplete
evidence. It has been observed that the lowering of the
levels of the evidence required occurs especially 'in the
case of claims commissions, which have to deal with
complex questions of fact relating to the claims of hun-
dreds or even thousands of individuals.'
The Panel finds that this observation is particularly apposite in con-
nection with category 'C' claims, in light of the hundreds of thou-
sands of claims to be resolved, the diversity of these claims and the
claimant population, as well as the evidentiary considerations and
questions of valuation involved. 
107
The Background Reports provided the necessary contextual background
for the claims, and filled in the gaps that could not be addressed by the
claimants.108 By doing so, the claimants were thereby relieved of proving
every essential element of their claims, such as causation. In the absence of
such reports, the lowering of evidentiary standards would have led to deci-
sions being made (for or against the claimants) on a materially incomplete
factual record-an arbitrary outcome at best.
Despite the meager attention that has been paid to the Background Re-
ports, this article contends that the resolution of individual claims could not
have been accomplished in a principled way without them. Without the
Background Reports, any given individual claimant would have had the dif-
ficult, if not impossible, task of establishing the complete factual record for
his or her claim. For example, how would an individual seeking compensa-
tion for personal injuries be able to explain the absence of contemporaneous
medical reports (which would be probative of the time and cause of injury)?
How would this person be able to prove the collapse of the health care sys-
tem to the point where such documentation was not prepared? At the time of
107 Id. at 28-29 (quoting DURWARD VALDAMIR SANDIFER, EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNALS 22 (rev. ed. 1975).
108 Id. at 27, 29.
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the injuries, the claimant would certainly not have been in the frame of mind
to start documenting the reasons for the absence of contemporaneous re-
cords. The difficulty, if not impossibility, of the situation would have been
aggravated if the claimant had been one of the many uneducated and un-
skilled laborers in Kuwait at the time of the invasion. Such a claimant
would have difficulties under the best of circumstances.10 9
It is not evident whether the Secretary-General or the Security Council
(the ones who requested the Background Reports), or the authors them-
selves, specifically contemplated that the reports would ultimately provide
crucial parts of the factual foundation for the resolution of individual claims.
Whether the utility of the reports as factual support for the Commissioners
was a result of deliberate design or a happy accident, one lesson was made
clear: Any future proceeding or commission like the UNCC will need to en-
gage in similar fact-finding to establish a foundation for the factual record
and address the needs of individual claimants. The Background Reports
eliminated the need for claimants to overcome such evidentiary hurdles, and
enabled the humanitarian process of individual compensation to proceed.
They also gave the Commissioners the confidence to act with the knowledge
and assurance that there was a reliable record for their decisions. Document-
ing the contextual facts and urgencies of war is a task that is ill-suited to the
individual victims of war, and the Background Reports served to remedy that
limitation.
IV. COMPARISONS TO AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE IRAN-UNITED
STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL
The structure and procedures of the UNCC were the result of deliberate
choices designed to achieve a fair and principled resolution of millions of
claims. Thus, it seems worthwhile to examine how and why the choices
were made. To this end, it is instructive to review the lessons drawn from
the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (the "Iran Tribunal").
Several commentators have drawn comparisons between the UNCC and
the Iran Tribunal."0 Such comparisons are natural. Prior to the existence of
109 It should also be noted that at the time the losses were suffered, the individual claimants
would have had no way of knowing that the UNCC would be formed to compensate them for
their losses. They would have had no reason to engage in any effort to gather evidence to
support their losses (even assuming they had an opportunity to do so amidst the circum-
stances).
110 See, e.g., Caron, United Nations Compensation Commission, supra note 2, at 317-18;
Bederman, supra note 13, at 15-17; Crook, supra note 85, at 145, 148; Garmise, supra note
21, at 847-48; Glod, supra note 21, at 719 (noting that Iran Tribunal is probably the "closest
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the UNCC, the Iran Tribunal had been the most recent attempt at the resolu-
tion of a large number of international claims."' More importantly, the sen-
ior staff of the UNCC was drawn from lawyers who had worked with the
Iran Tribunal, and "as generals are said to focus on fighting the last war, so
too did these and other alumni of the [Iran] Tribunal arrive at the UNCC
seeking to improve on the issues that had confronted them at the [Iran] Tri-
bunal." ' 12 The significance of this link between the staff of the UNCC and
the Iran Tribunal is that the choices made in structuring the UNCC were in-
fluenced by direct, first-hand experience of the strengths and weaknesses of
the Iran Tribunal. As noted by Mr. Wiihler, the experience of the Iran Tri-
bunal "informed a number of aspects of the UNCC's structure and proce-
dure, both in a positive and negative way," and "the relationship between the
two is a good example of how lessons from one institution may be useful for
another." ' 13 Hence, the work of the UNCC embodies and represents a sig-
nificant part of the accumulated knowledge of international claims resolu-
tion, and its lessons should guide any future attempts.
The Iran Tribunal was established in 1981 to resolve claims involving
the United States and Iran following the 1979 Iranian revolution.' 14 It grew
out of the resolution of the Iranian hostage crisis in which more than 50
Americans were held hostage in Tehran from November 1979, to January
1981, by representatives of the Iranian government. 15 Extensive negotia-
tions between the United States and Iran, largely brokered by Algeria, led to
an international executive agreement in January 198 1. The results of the ne-
gotiations were embodied in two declarations, collectively known as the Al-
giers Accords." 
6
The Iran Tribunal was established as an arbitration panel with nine arbi-
tration judges-three from the United States, three from Iran, and three na-
tionals from other states.' 17 The panel was empowered to hear claims
brought by U.S. citizens against Iran, claims brought by Iranian citizens
comparison"); Wihler, supra note 8, at 250.
111 See Bederman, supra note 13, at 15.
112 See Caron, United Nations Compensation Commission, supra note 2, at 317.
113 Wiihler, supra note 8, at 250.
114 Caron, United Nations Compensation Commission, supra note 2, at 313.
115 See Charles N. Brower, The Lessons of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: How May
They Be Applied in the Case of Iraq?, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 421, 422 (1992).
116 See Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, Background Information, Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal, http://www.iusct.org/background-english.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2006)
[hereinafter Tribunal Background Information]; see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
654, 662-65 (1981).
117 See generally Tribunal Background Information, supra note 116.
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against the United States, and claims between the two countries.' 1 8 Ap-
proximately 4,000 claims were filed." 9 Of these, 2,780 were small claims
brought by individuals, which were settled in one lump sum.
1 20
Based on the commentary of those who were personally involved in the
work of the Iran Tribunal, it appears that two important lessons were drawn
from the tribunal and applied to the UNCC: (A) the need to resolve individ-
ual claims quickly, and (B) the importance of adopting an inquisitorial ap-
proach rather than an adversarial approach as was used by the arbitration
proceedings of the Iran Tribunal.
A. The Need to Resolve Individual Claims Quickly
The treatment of individual claims before the Iran Tribunal provided a
strong lesson in how not to handle individual claims. Approximately 1,500
of the individual claims before the Iran Tribunal were brought by Americans
who had been expelled from Iran. 12 The individual claims, however, were
given a lower priority than corporate claims and were set aside while the
corporate claims were resolved first. 22 With the benefit of hindsight, one
commentator openly acknowledged that the resolution of corporate claims
before individual claims was a regrettable mistake:
Clearly, in humanitarian terms, these [individual] cases are of the
most compelling type, since they typically involve individuals who
have lost many, if not all, of their possessions, have been summarily
deprived of employment and whose lives thus may in fact be devas-
tated.
Perhaps the greatest failure of the Iran-United States Tribunal was
that prior to the lump sum settlement of most of these "wrongful ex-
pulsion" cases by the two governments in 1990-nine years after the
118 Id.
119 Brower, supra note 115, at 422.
120 Caron, United Nations Compensation Commission, supra note 2, at 314.
121 Brower, supra note 115, at 426. Brower notes that:
During a period of four months, beginning November 1, 1978 and ending Febru-
ary 28, 1979, virtually all of the 40,000 American citizens who prior to that time
had been in Iran left that country, never to return. This was due, it seemed, not
merely to revolutionary upheaval, but to the policy of the Khomeini forces as re-
flected in the Ayatollah's pronouncement on the day the Shah left Iran (January
16, 1979) that the U.S. government was the enemy of the Iranian people.
Id. at 426. The 1,500 individual American claims came from this group of 40,000.
122 Id. at 427; see also Caron, United Nations Compensation Commission, supra note 2, at
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Tribunal was formed and a dozen years or so after the losses were
incurred-the Tribunal had adjudicated only six such cases and had
awarded damages in only one.
The lower priority given to individual claims failed to reflect the fact
that individual claimants needed a prompt resolution of their claims. "The
individuals-small businessmen who were injured or lost their goods-often
desperately needed relief," notes Professor Caron. "But for corporations,"
he continues, "the claim resided in their books as a potential credit, and thus
lacked the equivalent urgency., 124 By the time the individual claimants re-
ceived their compensation from the Iran Tribunal, their immediate needs had
been unmet for years-thus degrading the value of the awards.
125
The work of the Commission, of course, placed a different priority on
individual claims. The UNCC staff with Iran Tribunal experience saw the
need to move the individuals with small claims to the front of the docket.
126
Clearly, the decision by the Governing Council to give first priority to the
individual claimants in Categories A, B, and C was influenced in some
measure by the experience of the Iran Tribunal as it was still fresh in the
minds of international observers.1
27
B. The Importance ofAdopting an Inquisitorial Approach
The slow pace at which claims were processed and the difficulty of
proving causation for individual claims in the Iran Tribunal demonstrated the
need to adopt an inquisitorial approach for claims processing. A clear lesson
from the Iran Tribunal was that an adversarial approach is slow.'12 While
most of the claims before the Iran Tribunal were settled, approximately 250
claims were arbitrated to a decision. It took ten years to arbitrate these 250
claims to conclusion. 29 It would have been manifestly obvious at the outset
123 Brower, supra note 115, at 427.
124 Caron, United Nations Compensation Commission, supra note 2, at 318.
125 Brower, supra note 115, at 427.
126 Caron, United Nations Compensation Commission, supra note 2, at 318.
127 With respect to those involved in the Iran Tribunal, this article should not be viewed as a
criticism of the choices or procedures adopted by that tribunal. It would be unfair to suggest
that the Iran Tribunal and the IJNCC can be compared on a like-for-like basis. The Iran Tri-
bunal was not confronted with a humanitarian crisis in the form of millions of individuals
who had suffered personal injuries and property losses in a war zone. It may be presumed
that the Iran Tribunal might have approached individual claims in a different manner if it have
found itself in the same situation as the UNCC.
... Id. at 313-14.
129 id.
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that the UNCC would not be able to accomplish its mandate to resolve over
2.6 million individual claims if it were to proceed on the same pace as the
Iran Tribunal. This fact alone would have led the original senior leadership
of the Commission away from the model of the Iran Tribunal.
There was another lesson to be drawn from the Iran Tribunal with re-
spect to individual claims. The individual American claimants before the
Iran Tribunal were unable to prove that they had been wrongfully expelled
by agents of the Iranian government because of the difficulty of determining
whether losses were in fact caused by the Iranian Government, by revolu-
tionary forces which became the Iranian Government, or by "popular move-
ments" or other random or independent agents. 30 The plight of these Ameri-
can claimants is exactly the situation that the individual claimants before the
UNCC would have faced if an adversarial process had been employed (as
illustrated by the hypothetical above of the Kuwaiti claimant who was un-
able to prove that it was Iraqi forces and no one else who destroyed and stole
her property). Again, it seems reasonable to conclude that the senior leader-
ship of the UNCC was aware of the problems that would be faced by civil-
ians fleeing a war zone (in the case of Kuwait) due to their experience with
civilians fleeing political upheaval (in the case of Iran).
In sum, the Iran Tribunal provided "real world" experiences and lessons
to guide the shaping of the UNCC. Such experiences and lessons undoubt-
edly put the UNCC's leadership in a position of strength to resist calls from
critics to adopt a different approach. As mentioned earlier, one of the harsh-
est critics of the Commission was Iraq's lawyer, who asserted that the adver-
sarial process was superior to the inquisitorial approach of the UNCC and
that the UNCC was "fundamentally flawed."' 31 In fairness to these com-
ments, they were expressed in the context of describing an almost $1 billion
corporate claim submitted by the Kuwait Oil Company and may not have
been directed at the process for individual claims. Nonetheless, the criti-
cisms are instructive to this analysis because they underscore the virtues of
the procedure adopted by the UNCC for the treatment of individual claims.
A central focus of the criticism was that Iraq was at a disadvantage in
the proceedings against the Kuwait Oil Company, "an immensely rich com-
pany, which retained for the preparation of its claims one of the largest and
130 Brower, supra note 115, at 428; see also Crook, supra note 85, at 148.
131 Schneider, supra note 63, at 25. A disinterested observer might point out that the critic's
views are colored by the fact that he was Iraq's lawyer, in a limited manner, before the Com-
mission. To balance out this observation, however, it is readily acknowledged that several of
the authors cited in this article, who are more supportive of the Commission, were or are af-
filiated with the Commission, including the author of this article.
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best reputed international law firms, together with major accounting firms
and other experts in producing international claims. '3 It may be open to
vigorous debate whether an adversarial or inquisitorial process is more ap-
propriate for the resolution of claims involving large companies like the
Kuwait Oil Company. There were certainly many large multinational com-
panies that filed claims in Category E, such as Chevron, 13 3 Halliburton,1
34
Chase Manhattan Bank and Merrill Lynch.135 But a discussion of which type
of system is better for these types of companies is a bit empty because
claimants like these are able to advance their position and are well-
represented in any type of forum.
The type of proceeding, however, makes a significant difference to an
individual claimant. Given the chaotic and life-threatening circumstances
giving rise to the losses, individual claimants would have faced perhaps in-
surmountable obstacles to proving their claims in an adversarial system. The
problem would have been magnified for claimants who were uneducated and
unskilled. The Commissioners were mindful of and sensitive to the ability
of an individual to assert a claim:
The Panel considered, to the extent available and relevant, the socio-
economic characteristics and invasion-related circumstances of
claimants from different countries, specifically in relation to their
ability to provide evidence in support of their claims. Article 35 of
the Rules states that the '[d]ocuments and other evidence required
will be the reasonable minimum that is appropriate under the particu-
lar circumstances of the case.' The claims themselves reveal a dis-
tinct difference in the quality, patterns, relevance and materiality of
the evidence submitted by claimants from different countries, and
within countries, by education and income level. Thus, considera-
tion was given to the impact that the invasion and the ensuing hostili-
ties had on claimants from particular countries. Further particular
socio-economic characteristics such as the education and income
Id. at 16.
133 See U.N. Compensation Commission, Governing Council, Report and Recommendations
Made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning Part Two of the Ninth Instalment of "El"
Claims, 205-88, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/2003/20 (Sep. 18, 2003) (seeking approximately $12
million).
134 See U.N. Compensation Commission, Governing Council, Report and Recommendations
Made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the Third Instalment of "El " Claims,
286-401, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1999/13 (June 25, 1999) (seeking more than $35 million).
135 See U.N. Compensation Commission, Governing Council, Report and Recommendations
Made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the Fifth Instalment of "E2" Claims, at 63-
64, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/2000/17 (Sep. 29, 2000), (seeking more than $11.8 million and $4.6
million, respectively).
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level of claimants from different countries and backgrounds were
considered .... Again, the Panel finds that such background infor-
mation and factors provide secondary or circumstantial support for
the claims and the allegations contained in claimant or witness
statements or attached documentation.
136
It is reasonable to conclude that the Governing Council recognized the
problems that individual claimants would face in an adversarial process and
that this recognition supported the decision to adopt an inquisitorial process.
This is not to suggest that the system was somehow tilted in favor of the
claimants. In fact, the statistics and the Panel Reports show that the Com-
missioners took an active role in protecting Iraq's interests. It would be
more accurate to say that because the JNCC would be judged by its ability
to achieve substantive fairness for all affected interests, it would have failed
had it imposed an adversarial system on the individual claimants. It would
have been difficult to defend the fairness of any proceeding which imposed
the burdens of an adversarial system on individuals whose lives had been
violently disrupted, or even shattered, by war. It would have been even
more indefensible to have imposed such burdens on those who occupied the
bottom of the socio-economic scale.
CONCLUSION
The number of individual claims (in the millions), the amounts involved
(in the billions) and the underlying humanitarian urgency (incalculable) cre-
ated significant challenges for the Commission. The Commission needed to
achieve a delicate balance between the rights of individuals, who had suf-
fered undeniable personal losses, and the rights of the Government of Iraq,
which had the right not to be treated as the writer of a blank check. This
balance also had to be achieved in a reasonable timeframe.
In order to achieve the goal of substantive fairness, the Commissioners
needed an adequate factual record to support their decisions. However, nei-
ther the individual claimants nor the Government of Iraq were in a position
to provide a complete or sufficient factual foundation for resolution of the
claims. The combination of the Commissioners' own fact-finding powers
and the Background Reports enabled the Panels of Commissioners to estab-
lish the factual foundation and record for their decisions. Indeed, any alter-
native procedure or framework that relied on the parties alone to establish
136 Category "C" Report, supra note 16, at 26-27. Along these lines, the Panel observed that
higher income claimants "submitted more substantive statements in support of their losses."
Id. at 180 n.294.
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the factual record would have failed because it would have allowed decisions
to be reached on non-substantive grounds unrelated to the merits. The les-
sons of the Commission suggest that any future claims resolution process in-
volving individual claims arising from war or war-like circumstances must
necessarily incorporate such fact-finding and fact-finding procedures in or-
der to remedy the almost certain inability of the parties to supply their own
record.
